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Wildlife crimeIn this article we develop a geopolitical ecology of foreign conservation assistance. While the literature on
thepolitical nature of foreign assistancewrit largehighlights howgeopolitical agendas are pursued through
foreign assistance, we focus on how this geopolitics of foreign assistance articulates with biodiversity con-
servation concerns. We draw attention to how conservation donor agencies negotiate shifting geopolitical
contexts in which the protection of biodiversity from the illegal wildlife trade (IWT) is increasingly framed
in the language of national security concerns. We ask: Does framing IWT as a national security concern
shape the allocation of foreign conservation assistance? What can answering this question tell us, both
empirically and conceptually, about the geopolitical ecology of foreign conservation assistance specifically,
and about the meaning of biodiversity conservation efforts to the state more broadly? We approach these
questions by combining in-depth qualitative and quantitative analyses of the foreign conservation assis-
tance provided by the US’ lead wildlife conservation agency, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS). Between 2002 to the end of fiscal year 2018, the USFWSDivision of International Affairs provided
assistance to 4142 projects across 106 countries worth over USD $301 million. Our results show that an
increasing portion of foreign assistance for biodiversity conservation is allocated to projects that have
the specific objective of combatingwildlife trafficking (CWT)at the expenseof other conservationpriorities.
This transformation of what it means to fund conservation work overseas, we argue, lies at the heart of an
emerging and intensifying geopolitical ecology of conservation,marked by increasing efforts to link the illi-
cit harvesting and trafficking of wildlife with concerns about threats to national security. We conclude by
discussing what a geopolitical ecology lens offers for understanding international assistance, biodiversity
conservation, more traditional geopolitical concerns, and the intersections between them.
 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articleunder the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).the backdrop of the escalation in commercial poaching and global‘‘...there’s something for everybody. If you love animals, if you
want to see a more secure world, if you want our economy not
to be corrupted globally by this kind of illicit behavior, there is
somuchwe can do together.” --- Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
Remarks at the Partnership Meeting on Wildlife Trafficking,
08/11/2012tance Act
ent to a
ncluding
personal,
and any
Govern-
or ‘‘aid”1. Introduction
In this articlewe examine how foreign assistance for biodiversity
conservation is shaped by geopolitical dynamics.We do this againstwildlife trafficking that has gained increasing attention in the for-
eign affairs and international conservation community. Foreign
assistance supporting interventions to address the illegal wildlife
trade (IWT) has increased dramatically over the past decade.1do not
aid. We
en used
sistency
2 F. Massé, J.D. Margulies /World Development 132 (2020) 104958Multilateral and bilateral donors provided over $1.3 billion (USD) in
assistance from 2010 to 2016 to address IWT in African and Asian
countries alone (The World Bank, 2016). The United States is one of
the largest providers of foreign assistance to combat wildlife traffick-
ing (CWT). The heightenedprofile of IWT at national and international
levels is occurring in response to global increases in particular kinds of
illegal wildlife trade that pose a legitimate threat to biodiversity. In
this article, however, we demonstrate that how IWT is discursively
understood andmobilized as a geopolitical-ecological issue has chan-
ged over time. In leveraging geopolitics, we are referring to how inter-
national concerns about the illicit harvestingand trafficking ofwildlife
have become increasingly entangled with concerns of national secu-
rity interests and the insecurities posed by transnational organized
crime (Duffy, 2014; 2016; Massé, Lunstrum, & Holterman, 2018).
The ecology in geopolitical-ecology draws attention to how certain
threats posed to nature help shape foreign policy, but also howgeopo-
litical dynamics have material implications for biodiversity and the
ways inwhich it ismanagedon-the-ground in specific locales. Starting
fromanunderstanding that neither foreignassistancenor biodiversity
conservation are apolitical subjects, we ask: Does framing IWT as a
geopolitical issue – as a form of destabilizing serious organized crime
and national security concern – shape priorities for wildlife conserva-
tion efforts internationally?What can answering this question tell us,
both empirically and conceptually, about the geopolitical ecology of
foreign conservation assistance specifically, and about transforma-
tions taking place reshaping the very meaning of biodiversity conser-
vation efforts more broadly?
We approach these questions through an examination of how
the geopolitical ecology of biodiversity conservation manifests in
the lead conservation agency of the United States, the US Fish
and Wildlife Service (USFWS). We specifically focus on its Division
of International Affairs. Within USFWS, the International Affairs
program provides funding to projects and partners in over 100
countries to assist and support species and habitat conservation.
We conducted a mixed-methods study of USFWS’ foreign assis-
tance by compiling and analysing all of the foreign assistance
USFWS International Affairs provided from 2002 to the end of
2018. We examine what types of projects USFWS foreign assis-
tance supports, where, for which species, and how this has shifted
over time. We combine this qualitative-quantitative assessment
with in-depth interviews with key stakeholders and discursive
analysis of policy documents, reports, and legislation. This method-
ology enables an understanding of temporal changes in the alloca-
tion of foreign assistance for biodiversity conservation and the
context and reasoning underpinning these shifts. We find an
increasing portion of foreign assistance for biodiversity conserva-
tion being allocated to projects with the specific objective of com-
bating wildlife trafficking (CWT). This marks a move away from
funding species and habitat conservation, broadly understood, as
well as community-focused interventions, to a narrower focus on
combating wildlife trafficking through greater funding of law
enforcement both within and outside of conservation protected
areas.
This transformation of what it means to fund conservation work
overseas lies at the heart of an emerging and intensifying geopolit-
ical ecology of conservation, marked by efforts to link the illicit
harvesting and trafficking of wildlife with concerns about threats
to national security. Foreign assistance to conservation thus
increasingly fits within and contributes to broader dynamics of
securitizing other types of foreign assistance, including develop-
ment aid (Duffield, 2010; McCormack & Gilbert, 2018; Massé
et al., 2018). As the proceeding sections demonstrate, the changing
manner in which biodiversity conservation is framed, discussed,
and contextualized within the US foreign policy agenda impacts
how conservation is understood and practiced, which alters how
foreign conservation assistance is allocated. As such, our studyreveals how an institution with a specific mandate to conserve
wildlife and their habitats, like USFWS, operates within and nego-
tiates a broader geopolitical and foreign policy milieu, in turn shap-
ing their funding decisions and priorities.
It is here where our study contributes to the recent scholarship
on geopolitical ecology, which represents an ‘‘explicit encounter
between critical geopolitics and political ecology” (Bigger &
Neimark, 2017: 14). We develop a geopolitical ecology of foreign
conservation assistance. In the context of this study, this means
drawing attention to how conservation donor agencies negotiate
shifting contexts in which the protection of biodiversity is increas-
ingly framed in the language of national security concerns, and
with what material effects. Developing these conceptual linkages
brings political ecology’s interests with how ecological transforma-
tions intersect with matters of political economy and the produc-
tion of environmental inequalities into conversation with
geopolitical matters of statecraft, foreign policy, and the role of
geopolitical institutions intervening in and shaping environments
(Benjaminsen, Buhaug, McConnell, Sharp, & Steinberg, 2017;
O’Lear, 2019).
In what follows, we develop a conceptual framework to under-
stand the geopolitical ecology of foreign assistance more broadly,
and of conservation specifically. We combine insights from the
political ecology of conservation (Asiyanbi, 2016; Neumann,
1998; Peluso & Vandergeest, 2011; West, 2006), critical geopolitics
of foreign assistance, broadly understood (Bachmann, Bell, &
Holmqvist, 2015; Bryan, 2015; Fassin, 2010), and recent work on
geopolitical ecology (Belcher, Bigger, Neimark, & Kennelly, 2019;
Bigger & Neimark, 2017). While literature on the political nature
of foreign assistance highlights the geopolitics of such assistance,
we highlight how this articulates with ecological concerns and
related discourses (Benjaminsen et al., 2017). We then develop a
brief history of how IWT gained prominence as a geopolitical issue
in US national security and foreign policy agendas. Following a
description of the study method, we then work through the case
study of the USFWS International Affairs program to analyze shifts
in foreign assistance to biodiversity conservation. Here, we elabo-
rate a mixed-methods approach for doing geopolitical ecology. This
approach complements and broadens the scope of fine-scaled anal-
ysis prevalent in political-ecological work by combining a meta-
study of globally-oriented funding with in-depth qualitative
research. This approach enables a robust analysis of global trends
and how apparatuses of state power shape human-environment
policy from a distance. We conclude by discussing what a geopolit-
ical ecology lens offers for understanding foreign assistance, biodi-
versity conservation, more traditional geopolitical concerns, the
intersections between them and how this could materialize in
development-specific funding and agencies.2. Geopolitical ecology of foreign conservation assistance
Bigger and Neimark (2017) define geopolitical ecology as a
‘‘conceptual framework that combines the strengths of political
ecology with those of geopolitics in order to account for, and gain
a deeper understanding, of the role of large geopolitical institu-
tions, like the US military, in environmental change” (14). Their
argument for drawing together critical geopolitical scholarship
with the analytical and theoretical tools of political ecology builds
on prior work operating in this conceptual space; for instance,
work in political geography of the environment (Benjaminsen
et al., 2017; Sundberg, 2009; Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995) and
environmental security studies (Dalby, 2009; 2014; Duffy, 2006;
2010). Political ecology is concerned with how environmental
change, land degradation, and human-environment relations,
including conservation, are inherently political and shaped by
F. Massé, J.D. Margulies /World Development 132 (2020) 104958 3uneven power relations across multiple scales. The insertion of
geo- focuses attention on those specific institutions and power
relations that behave geopolitically and shape environments
through actions and discourses of geopolitical statecraft (see for
example O’Lear, 2019). Critical geopolitics more explicitly captures
the discursive, representational, and political-economic dynamics
that shape foreign policy, territorial and resource control, and
national and international security (Mercille, 2008; O’Lear, 2019;
(Power & Campbell, 2010) Toal, 1996). Critical geopolitics also
highlights the increasing influence of non-traditional security con-
cerns and actors into these arenas (Dalby, 2010; 2014; Koopman,
2011). Bigger and Neimark (2017), for example, specifically locate
the workings of geopolitical ecology in the military’s use of climate
change to justify the provision and acquisition of new biofuel pow-
ered military hardware, technologies, and ways of waging war.
We further develop the framework and approach of geopolitical
ecology by analysing a sub-set of human-environment relations
that is a core area of concern for political ecology, namely biodiver-
sity conservation. Specific intersections between the military, con-
servation, and security apparatuses have long-formed part of a
geopolitical ecology, even where the term itself is not used. For
example, Peluso and Vandergeest (2011) examine how the crisis
discourses of national security related to Cold War insurgencies
came together to extend conservation and state territoriality
through militarized and counter-insurgency means. Similar inter-
sections and practices persist in a range of contexts (Dunlap &
Fairhead, 2014), from Africa (Asiyanbi, 2016; Verweijen &
Marijnen, 2018) to Latin America (Ybarra, 2012; Devine, 2014)
and Asia (Barbora, 2017; Margulies, 2018). As a number of scholars
demonstrate, biodiversity conservation as both a practice and
means of ordering space has become increasingly militarized in
orientation, especially in regard to how conservation rangers and
protected area staff interact with communities living alongside
(and often times, dispossessed from) conservation spaces
(Annecke & Masubele, 2016; Duffy 2014; 2016; Duffy et al.,
2019; Mabele, 2017; Massé & Lunstrum, 2016). Lunstrum (2014,
817) captures this dynamic with the concept of ‘green militariza-
tion’, defined as ‘‘the use of military and paramilitary (military-
like) actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pur-
suit of conservation.” A number of researchers further develop
these themes through the inter-related concepts of ‘‘green vio-
lence” (Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2015), ‘‘green wars” (Büscher &
Fletcher, 2018; Ybarra, 2018), and ‘‘green security” (Kelly &
Ybarra, 2016) which detail the use of violence and warfare against
the public in securing conservation spaces and biodiversity
(Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Howson, 2018; Fletcher, 2018; Pennaz,
Ahmadou, Moritz, & Scholte, 2018).
Directly pertinent to our intervention are the ways threats to
wildlife from illegal hunting and trafficking of flora and fauna are
securitized and treated as an issue of national security. Formerly
considered merely a matter of conservation concern (which it is),
the illegal trade in wildlife is now accompanied by narratives fram-
ing ‘‘poachers as terrorists” and the poaching economy as national
security threat (Duffy, 2014; 2016: 238; Lunstrum & Ybarra, 2018;
Hüebschle, 2017; Massé & Lunstrum, 2016). While poaching-
terrorism connections remain largely unsubstantiated by evidence
(Duffy, 2016; Haenlein and Smith, 2017; Pennaz et al., 2018), these
narratives are productive for certain actors in mobilizing and justi-
fying military or security-style interventions in conservation
spaces, and the para-militarization of conservation rangers (Duffy
et al., 2019; Verweijen & Marijnen, 2018). These types of interven-
tions reflect broader trends in how the discourse of securitization
as a contemporary paradigm operates as a mode of antipolitics
(Ferguson, 1994), sidestepping debates over responsibility for
structural, socio-political and economic drivers of environmental
challenges and change (Gourevitch, 2010).While we are not focused explicitly on the militarization of con-
servation in this article, foreign assistance and its providers are
deeply entwined with geopolitical activities. The development-
security nexus, for example, refers to the coupling of foreign assis-
tance allocation with particular donor country national security
interests (Bryan, 2015; Duffield, 2010; Stern & Öjendal, 2010). Of
particular concern to critical scholars studying the security-
development nexus is the increasing amount of development assis-
tance being allocated towards security-focused interventions and
subsequently away from more traditional development concerns
such as poverty alleviation, education, and human health
(Bachmann, 2018; McCormack, 2018; McCormack & Gilbert,
2018). This shift in allocation occurs alongside the expanded enrol-
ment of military, policing, and security sector actors on the ground
and in decision-making, including what gets funded, where, and to
what degree (Bachmann, Bell, & Holmqvist, 2015; Duffield, 2010;
Fassin, 2010). The integration and linking of development assis-
tance with security concerns is emergent in development assis-
tance to conservation. Development assistance by the European
Commission, for example, increasingly supports green militariza-
tion in Virunga National Park (Marijnen, 2017). Massé et al.
(2018) demonstrate how development interventions in a rhino
poaching hotspot try to prevent people’s involvement in illicit
wildlife economies to ‘‘neutralize the security threat poaching
might pose” (2). These examples reveal direct connections between
the geopolitics and security politics of conservation, development,
and foreign assistance.
Militarization and the ways in which militaries become
involved in nature protection (or destruction) are no doubt central
to a geopolitical ecology of conservation. However, the integration
of biodiversity conservation, geopolitics, and security interests
may not necessarily lead to militarized or outright securitized
responses. Much like the development-security nexus, the deepen-
ing of links between these fields and communities of actors can
contribute to more subtle shifts in the priorities of biodiversity
protection in important ways. We identify foreign assistance to
biodiversity conservation as one of these subtle arenas of geopolit-
ical ecology warranting greater attention, even where it may not
support outright militarized practices.
More specifically, the shifts in allocation of foreign assistance by
a country’s lead wildlife conservation agency, like USFWS, result-
ing from the geopolitical framing of IWT at the highest levels of
state power reveals geopolitics working through conservation,
and affecting biodiversity conservation on-the-ground. Our inter-
vention here is less about how powerful geopolitical institutions
like the US State Department and congressional foreign affairs
committees directly manage nature and contribute to environmen-
tal change—though this is certainly a question of relevance for
geopolitical ecology. Rather, we are focused on how the USFWS,
as a conservation agency providing assistance for biodiversity pro-
tection overseas, negotiates shifting geopolitical contexts that
frame threats to biodiversity conservation. In negotiating these
contexts, we focus on how (intentionally or not) USFWS foreign
assistance produces material and political effects on the ground
through shaping conservation activities.
2.1. Foreign assistance to biodiversity conservation
Like other forms of foreign assistance, environment-focused for-
eign assistance is not shielded from broader political-economic
concerns. Power dynamics and competing interests shape how
the ‘‘environment” and ‘‘natural resource protection” are defined
for the purposes of foreign assistance. In the US context, the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1977 first authorized foreign ‘‘assistance
for environmental and natural resources protection and manage-
ment” (Ivory, 1992: 1063). Shaped by the ideological priorities
4 F. Massé, J.D. Margulies /World Development 132 (2020) 104958and political climate prevailing at the time, foreign assistance to
the environment in the 1970s and into the 1980s was driven pri-
marily by an economic rationale focused on promoting the sustain-
able use of resources for poverty alleviation, rather than
biodiversity protection as a specific target (Ivory, 1992; Corson,
2010). Corson (2010) demonstrates how the focus of environmen-
tal assistance began to shift in the 1980s as a constellation of inter-
ests and actors from NGOs, civil society, and the private sector
worked through the US Congress to prioritize biological diversity
and species protection, particularly in the Global South, in foreign
environmental assistance. It is within this context that in 1987 the
US Congressional Appropriations Committee first mandated for-
eign assistance to fund biodiversity conservation overseas. During
the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the US Congress reconfigured
the meaning of foreign environmental assistance. ‘‘The environ-
ment,” in terms of foreign assistance, came to be defined ‘‘as for-
eign biodiversity, to be protected in parks away from competing
economic and political interests and in foreign countries”
(Corson, 2010: 578). Not only did this shift create a new and speci-
fic space for foreign assistance dedicated to biodiversity conserva-
tion, it also demonstrates how US Congress, its sub-committees,
other parts of the US government, and the networks they enroll
to advise them play a major role in shaping the trajectory and pri-
orities of foreign assistance to environmental and biodiversity
issues.
Foreign assistance to biodiversity conservation can have differ-
ent objectives. Miller (2014: 341), for example, examines
biodiversity-related official development assistance and differenti-
ates between ‘‘mixed” biodiversity assistance and ‘‘strict” biodiver-
sity assistance (also see Hicks, Parks, Roberts, & Tierney, 2010;
Miller, Agrawal, & Roberts, 2013). The former refers to assistance
that ‘‘explicitly addresses both ecological and economic objec-
tives.” Strict biodiversity assistance, on the other hand, refers to
assistance ‘‘which is more narrowly focused on conservation objec-
tives without a stated development component” (341). While we
focus on foreign assistance broadly, as USFWS does not necessarily
abide by official development assistance parameters, Miller
demonstrates how assistance to support conservation-related pro-
jects can have multiple objectives.
As the US’ lead wildlife conservation agency at home and
abroad, the USFWS International Affairs program, established in
1989, provides assistance through its granting programs to part-
ners around the world to support species and habitat conserva-
tion.2 The USFWS’ mandate is specific to the conservation of
species and their habitats, and may support community-based natu-
ral resource management and livelihood projects insofar as they
contribute to the objective of biodiversity conservation. Building
on Miller (2014), our analysis of USFWS funding points to an emer-
gent, third, category of conservation assistance that neither ‘‘strict”
nor ‘‘mixed” definitions account for. This is conservation assistance
that has both biodiversity and security objectives.
We draw on the geopolitical ecology framework advanced by
Bigger and Neimark (2017) and insights from the literature on
the geopolitics of foreign assistance to examine the prioritization
of IWT and related security concerns in foreign assistance for con-
servation. We highlight three key themes for thinking about the
geopolitical ecology of foreign conservation assistance: 1) the ways
in which geopolitical discourse justifies certain conservation-
related actions, priorities, decision-making, and funding decisions;
2) the political-economic structures through which foreign conser-
vation assistance decision-making happens; and 3) how actors
working within geopolitical settings and institutions help produce2 https://www.fws.gov/international/wildlife-without-borders/africa/central-
africa.html.high-level understandings about biodiversity, challenges to pro-
tecting it, and how best to do so. Drawing on our analysis of USFWS
International Affairs, we mobilize this framework to examine how
foreign conservation funding and assistance is allocated, how this
has shifted over time, and with what implications.3. Methods
3.1. Analysis of US Fish and Wildlife Service International Affairs
3.1.1. Data collection
We gathered data on foreign assistance provided by the USFWS
International Affairs program from the US Foreign Aid Explorer
(FAE).3 We searched the FAE using filters related to USFWS funding
accounts for the years 2002–2018 and exported this data for analy-
sis. These filters include U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Resource
Management; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Multinational Species
Fund; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Contributed Funds. Any search
using the above filters for pre-2002 yields no disaggregated results.
We conducted a process of data cleaning to ensure that each
project had an adequate ‘Activity Description’ and/or ‘Activity
Name.’ For any project that was missing an Activity Description
we manually searched the USFWS International Affairs annual pro-
ject summaries and filled in the information where possible. We
also ensured that funding amounts in the FAE database and USFWS
project summaries aligned by performing a manual check. We
deleted from the database any duplicates and projects that had
no adequate description or name for analysis. To cross-validate
our methodology, we shared our produced dataset, methodology
and subsequent results with USFWS International Affairs program
staff, who supplied us with missing information and corrected
errors they detected in the dataset due to mistakes within the
FAE database.3.1.2. Code building, development, and testing
We employed an inductive thematic coding technique follow-
ing a grounded-theory methodology to analyze USFWS Interna-
tional Affairs funding (Charmaz, 2006). Code development
entailed a multi-step process using the constant comparison tech-
nique, including multiple rounds of code development, training,
and inter-coder reliability testing (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). We
designed the codes to capture the principle objectives of USFWS
funded projects. We began with an initial sample of projects
(n = 40) to develop coding categories. Each of the authors indepen-
dently coded this sample dataset without any previously defined
codes. The inductively produced codes by each author were then
compared and refined. The process of coding a sample dataset
was repeated with the set of codes and again compared and refined
using a new subsample in order to develop theoretical saturation
(n = 40). This process was repeated again, further adjusting the
codes by refining the language, folding some codes into broader
codes, and expanding others into multiple codes until we were
confident the set of codes adequately covered the full scope of
USFWS projects.
Through this exercise we developed a set of nine primary the-
matic codes (Table 1). The first author consulted USFWS materials,
project documents, and notice of funding opportunities to compare
the codebook with the language used by USFWS. We made minor
modifications to the codebook language to harmonize our code-
book with USFWS language for congruency when undertaking doc-
ument analysis. Next, we formalized code definitions, and detailed
the inclusion and exclusion criteria of the codes. Both authors then3 Any U.S. Government department or agency that provides foreign assistance must
report this to USAID’s Economic Analysis and Data Services that manages the FAE.
Table 1
Project Codes and Definitions.
Code Description
Supporting Habitat Conservation & Management
(non-Law Enforcement)
Programs that support conservation and management efforts, broadly defined, but that excludes law enforcement
and anti-poaching management; broad support for protected areas and their development and management,
including equipment, infrastructure and so forth; monitoring of species populations.
Combating Wildlife Trafficking (CWT) Programs that have the primary objective of reducing poaching, the illegal killing of wildlife, and wildlife trafficking.
This includes programmes that aim to strengthen, develop, support, and train law enforcement in protected areas
and habitats. Law enforcement is often used synonymously with anti-poaching.
Community-Based Natural Resource
Management (CBRNM)
Programs that seeks to involve local people/communities in conservation or species/habitat management. This also
includes programmes focused on awareness raising, outreach and education for communities in and around
protected areas (i.e. ‘local communities’).
Research Programs that are primarily funding studies and research. Research can generally be defined as those programmes
that seek to study something or acquire new information and data about species, populations, landscapes and
related dynamics. Even if the research is to improve or act in support of conservation management it should be
coded as ‘Research’ to distinguish programmes that fund research for the improvement of conservation
management and programmes that support and do conservation management. Also includes studies to understand
species population and dynamics.
Capacity building of local stakeholders for
conservation
Programs that aim to train and improve the capacity of local stakeholders (e.g. politicians, leaders, practitioners) to
do conservation; about funding the training/capacity building of local stakeholders to do it rather than funding the
actually management activities themselves.
Human Wildlife Conflict (HWC) Management Programs that have the objective of mitigating, reducing, and/or managing adverse effects of wildlife on human
populations and their property.
Education, Dissemination, Networking Programs that seek to support higher education initiatives, the dissemination of research, and the funding of
conferences, workshops, and symposiums that can help people connect and disseminate experiences and findings
related to conservation.
Wildlife Product Demand Reduction Programs encompassing efforts to reduce the demand and consumption of wildlife through education, awareness
raising, outreach, behaviour change.
All A broad code allocated to projects that are very broad in scope and that aim to achieve four or more objectives
within the same project.
F. Massé, J.D. Margulies /World Development 132 (2020) 104958 5tested the refined codes on a larger sample of 150 projects to again
ensure the codes comprehensively covered all activities. This
resulted in a finalized code book that provided detailed instruc-
tions for the coding process.4
The first author trained a research assistant on the codes and
coding process. After studying the code book, the lead author and
assistant separately coded the same 10 percent sample of the pro-
jects (n = 374). We performed an intercoder reliability test using
Krippendorff’s Alpha (KALPHA) method (De Swert, 2012;
Krippendorff, 2011) and the KALPHA macro developed by Hayes
and Krippendorff (2007). The test yielded a high intercoder reliabil-
ity score (j = 0.8603, n = 374). A KALPHA score above 0.80 is gen-
erally considered as the standard for intercoder reliability testing,
with a minimum score of 0.67 often considered acceptable (De
Swert, 2012). A bootstrapping procedure indicated only a 2.2 per-
cent chance of a KALPHA score below 0.80 if the whole dataset
were tested. The assistant and lead author next proceeded to code
the entire dataset, excluding 2018 projects which were coded by
the lead author. Once complete, the lead author conducted a spot
check of a random 10% sample of the entire dataset (>95% inter-
coder agreement).
To delve deeper into the potential significance of USFWS fund-
ing trends we conducted a second round of coding on a subset of
projects using the IWT-intervention categories developed by the
World Bank in its report analyzing foreign assistance to address
IWT (The World Bank, 2016). The World Bank uses six categories
to define these interventions: Policy and Legislation; Law Enforce-
ment; Protected Area Management to Prevent Poaching; Commu-
nication and Awareness; Promoting Sustainable use and
Alternative Livelihoods; and Research and Assessments (See
Table 2).5 We coded each of the projects categorized as either
CWT or Demand Reduction in the USFWS database (n = 1418)
according to one of these six World Bank intervention categories4 See supplementary material for the code book.
5 We included projects coded as Demand Reduction in this subset of projects
because demand reduction is included in and is a priority of the World Bank’s
Communication and Awareness intervention category(see section 6 for results). Within the context of USFWS International
Affairs funding, the results provide an understanding of what exactly
it means to support CWT, what CWT-focused projects entail, and
how this has changed over time.3.2. Contextualizing document analysis
We compiled and analyzed over 60 individual documents,
including policy briefs, agency annual budget reports, legislation,
multilateral agency documents, and program descriptions in the
qualitative data analysis software Nvivo. We conducted this docu-
ment analysis to contextualize the analysis of USFWS International
Affairs funding. Government documents included those from the
US Department of State, United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), US Fish andWildlife Service, the US Govern-
ment Accountability Office, and the White House. Other docu-
ments included reports by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, The World Bank, and the Global Environment Facility.
We inductively coded documents using an iterative and grounded
theory approach with repeated cross-referencing and discussion
between both authors (Charmaz, 2006). Examples of codes gener-
ated through this inductive process included ‘‘framing IWT as a
form of serious organized crime”, ‘‘IWT as form of threat finance”,
and ‘‘elephant poaching as emotional subject.”3.3. Qualitative interviews
To further contextualize the coded dataset of USFWS Interna-
tional Affairs funded projects, we conducted in-depth, semi-
structured interviews (N = 16) and focus groups (N = 2) with key
stakeholders, which we discursively analyzed following a similar
coding procedure as for document analysis. Participants included
actors within several offices of USFWS, The World Bank, USAID,
The State Department, and at several leading conservation organi-
zations who have received funding from the USFWS International
Affairs Program, among other interviewees. High-level interviews
offer critical insights into how particular agencies and key individ-
Table 2
IWT Intervention Categories Adopted from the World Banks’ Global Environment
Facility (The World Bank, 2016).
IWT Intervention Category Description
Policy and Legislation Inter-sectoral policies and regulatory
frameworks that incorporate wildlife
conservation and management considerations;
strengthening laws and customs/trade
facilitation process.
Law Enforcement Coordination mechanisms and establishment of
operational units, intelligence-led operations,
and transnational law enforcement
coordination to tackle higher-level operatives;
increased capacity of customs officials,
transportation, and detection technologies.
PA Management to
Prevent Poaching
Protection of natural habitats for species; on-
the-ground support to PAs to address poaching
(i.e. rangers, equipment etc.); investments to
increase community, private, and state reserves
and surrounding areas protected forests under
land use policies that mitigate wildlife poaching
and promote wildlife management best
practices.
Communications and
Awareness
Outreach and communications efforts to raise
awareness and reduce demand across range,
transit, and end-use countries demand
reduction efforts and campaigns to increase
awareness, change consumer behaviour toward
consumption of illegal wildlife products, and
reduce market participants in the illegal trade.
Promoting Sustainable Use
and alt livelihoods
Incentives for communities to live with and
manage wildlife and to avoid human-wildlife
conflict; income derived from wildlife
management in support of sustainable
development and integrated natural resource
management practices; alternative legal
livelihoods to those involved in the illegal trade.
Research and Awareness Decisions support tools, research, analysis,
databases, stakeholder coordination, knowledge
management, and monitoring.
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foreign conservation assistance more broadly. They also deepen
our understanding of the changing discourses about illegal wildlife
trade within US foreign policy and conservation sectors.6 In addi-
tion to these interviews, this article is broadly informed by over
seven years of qualitative research across four continents by both
authors on IWT and conservation, offering insight into how (US) for-
eign assistance to address IWT manifest on the ground in both
source and consumer countries, and how this has changed over time.
4. From ‘boutique issue’ to ‘international crisis’: The shifting
discourse of IWT in US foreign policy and its effects
On Thursday May 24, 2012, Senator John Kerry made the open-
ing remarks in a hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations in
the United States Senate titled, ‘‘Ivory and Insecurity: The Global
Implications of Poaching in Africa.” He began by acknowledging
that the matter of ivory poaching ‘‘may seem to some to be slightly
off the beaten path” for the Foreign Relations Committee (US
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2012:1). It is worth quot-
ing what Senator Kerry said later in the meeting at length, in con-
versation with Tom Cardamone, Managing Director of Global
Financial Integrity, a Washington DC-based security consulting
firm, and Dr. Iain Douglas-Hamilton, founder of Save the Elephants,
a Nairobi-based conservation organization, both of whom were
invited to give testimony to the committee:6 Interviews have been anonymized. Consent from research participants was
obtained via written or verbal consent based on their preference in accordance with
approved University research ethics protocols.The trick here. . .is not to lose sight of the connectedness of all of
these things. This is not just about elephants. It is not just about
poaching in one place. The dots connect here to the whole issue
of failed states, governance, lack of law enforcement, preying on
people, the sort of random violence that comes as a consequence
of this, the enormous sums of money. Criminal syndicates are
walking away with billions of dollars out of this. And one of the
things that I saw full square in the 1980s when we began to look
at Noriega’s bank of preference and ran across Osama bin Laden’s
name was that this is all interconnected. The opaqueness is used
by all of these illicit entities, including terrorist groups, to move
their money, to avoid accountability, to stay outside of governing
structures. And all of those entities that are outside of those gov-
erning structures are depleting the capacity of states to function
and to do what they are supposed to do. So, I think that this is
worth raising the heat on it [ivory poaching] a little bit because
those same thugs who can come in there and do that are also going
to rape, pillage, plunder, move narcotics, facilitate somebody’s abil-
ity to get money illicitly and may wind up blowing up a bunch of
people in some community square. And so, I think it is important
to fight back against failed statism, against the absence of gover-
nance, and I view this as a component of that (2012: 43–44).
The linkages SenatorKerrymakesbetween IWT, failed states, and
ivory as a source of threat financewere later debunkedasmythspro-
moted by certain conservation non-profit organizations (Duffy,
2016; Haenlein and Smith, 2017;; Pennaz et al., 2018). But the Sen-
ate hearing represented a key watershed moment signalling how
future discussions about IWTwould be approached and discursively
framed within US foreign and domestic policy circles. It was one of
the first high-profile fora signalling that IWT would be integrated
into US foreign policy and national security agenda-setting. While
claims of ‘‘poachers-as-terrorists” were unsubstantiated (Duffy,
2016: 238), what matters is the discursive power of such claims in
shaping foreign assistance and conservation priorities.
Specifically, we focus on the ways in which IWT would now be
leveraged to funnel US foreign assistance through more appealing
and malleable IWT narratives, namely, the affective and emotional
power of graphic imagery about slaughtered elephants, simple
links to insecurity, and placing blame on foreign peoples and gov-
ernments such as weak African states and China and East Asian
consumers of IWT products (Margulies, Wong, & Duffy, 2019). As
a former White House Council on Environmental Quality staff
member summarized, ‘‘. . .so when we were part of the conversa-
tions, it [discussion about IWT] was almost always hand in hand
with these security concerns and issues. . .and then it was ele-
phants, there was this emotional thing around elephants. Those
were the predominant themes that created momentum and pas-
sion around the issue” (Interview, 11/2019).
Senator Kerry’s remarks signalled a rapid succession of events
and policy actions declaring IWT as a priority of US foreign policy.
Six months later, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hosted a ‘‘Part-
nership Meeting on Wildlife Trafficking” at the State Department.
In a similar message to the events’ attendees, Secretary Clinton
began her keynote address saying:
Now, some of you might be wondering why a Secretary of State
is keynoting an event about wildlife trafficking and conservation,
or why we are hosting this event at the State Department in the
first place. Well, I think it’s because. . .over the past few years wild-
life trafficking has become more organized, more lucrative, more
widespread, and more dangerous than ever before. . .I think many
of us are here because protecting wildlife is a matter of protecting
our planet’s natural beauty. We see it’s a stewardship responsibil-
ity for us and this generation and future generations to come. But it
is also a national security issue, a public health issue, and an eco-
nomic security issue that is critical to each and every country rep-
resented here (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2012).
8 https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3547/text.
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lar lines:
The event brought together foreign ambassadors and leaders
from international organizations, non-governmental conservation
organizations and the private sector to energize and strengthen
the global commitment to combat the illegal trade in wildlife
and promote conservation by placing it squarely on the foreign pol-
icy and security agenda (US Department of State, 2012, emphasis
added).
The statement also demonstrates how the State Department, as
representative of a concerned global community, enrolled conser-
vation organizations in foreign policy and security matters and
circles.
The US was not alone in raising the profile of IWT. Concerns
about IWT and combating wildlife trafficking as a matter of serious
and transnational organized crime that undermines local, national,
and global stability has progressively garnered attention at the
highest levels of international politics. This is exemplified through
successive resolutions by various UN bodies including the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, the UN Crime Commission, and the
2015 UN General Assembly Resolution 69/314 that elevated IWT
to a serious crime (United Nations, 2015). We highlight these dec-
larations because they unlock capacity for political action and
mobilize material support for addressing IWT. As one US represen-
tative who was intimately involved in drafting US and UN policy
resolutions on IWT explained, the US and Norway took the lead
and co-sponsored the UN resolution because having IWT recog-
nized as a serious crime in that forum ‘‘serves as a resource for
law enforcement unlocking international cooperation tools for
them to do joint investigations for mutual legal assistance” (Inter-
view, 04/2019).
These statements, policies, and declarations exemplify how the
meaning of illegal wildlife trade and the protection of wildlife has
changed over the past 20 years in US Federal policy and legislative
arenas. Moreover, and as summarized here, the emergence of IWT
as a high-profile national security and foreign policy issue occurred
in large part through its rapid prioritization by a small number of
powerful political actors:
[It was a] kind of perfect storm. . .[Secretary Clinton] was intri-
gued just like then Senator Kerry was intrigued on the security
apparatus [aspects] of the issue, from [it being] a longstanding con-
servation issue. The financial money laundering aspect, the secu-
rity and tourists linkages, all of those things. . .That was the game
changer for why, what led to. . .the President’s Task Force for com-
bating wildlife trafficking (Interview with former State Depart-
ment staffer, 04/2019).
With particular attention to the United States, Fig. 1 highlights
key moments since 2011 related to the transformation of IWT from
a ‘‘boutique issue” into ‘‘an international crisis” on the foreign pol-
icy agenda (USAID Program Officer Interview, 04/2018).7 Within
the span of less than a decade, the illicit harvesting and trafficking
of flora and fauna was re-packaged by powerful governmental, mul-
tilateral, and non-governmental international bodies into an issue of
serious organized crime, a lucrative funding source for terrorist net-
works, and contributor to regional destabilization in areas of geopo-
litical importance to both the United States and international allies.
We accept the legitimacy of the increasing problem of illegal wildlife
trade during this same time period, but our interest is with how
these issues came to be understood not just as linked to national
security issues, but became national security problems requiring
intervention.7 Also see the Executive Order on Combatting Wildlife Trafficking for ‘‘international
crisis” language. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/01/
executive-order-combating-wildlife-traffickingThe momentum to combat wildlife trafficking as an issue of
geopolitical and national security importance continued, moving
from the realm of discourse and symbolic action to material,
legal, and policy effects. Around a year after the 2012 milestones
noted above, President Obama issued the Order on Combating
Wildlife Trafficking and established the Presidential Task Force
on Wildlife Trafficking. Shortly thereafter in 2014, the US
released its National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking.
In the same year the US Congress, and specifically the Sub-
Committee on Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs explicitly appropriated $45 million in the for-
eign assistance biodiversity budget to ‘‘combat the transnational
threat of wildlife poaching and trafficking.”8 This was the first
time funding for CWT was earmarked in the foreign assistance
budget. Appropriations increased to $55 million in 2015, $80 mil-
lion in 2016, and almost $91 million in each of 2017, 2018, and
2019.9 In 2011, the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs had an annual budget for
wildlife or conservation-related law enforcement of $100,000.
Today the budget is over $50 million a year. On the legal front,
the Eliminate, Neutralize, Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act
passed in 2016 codified the National Strategy in law. This law
also established a CWT granting program to be managed by
USFWS in support of CWT-focused projects overseas. The first
Notice of Funding Opportunity for the CWT grants went out in
2016 and the USFWS supported 12 projects worth $1,162,775.
In 2017 the importance of IWT as a transnational organized crime
priority was again reiterated through its inclusion in President
Trump’s 2017 Executive Order on Transnational Criminal Organi-
zations and Trafficking (White House, 2017). IWT’s inclusion in
this executive order also worked to safeguard funding for CWT
in the context of large government spending cuts (Interview,
04/2019).
It is thus insufficient to develop a geopolitical ecology of con-
servation by only focusing on the ‘‘speech acts” of elite actors.
The changing priorities of IWT and conservation have in turn
altered the political economy of conservation, combating wildlife
trafficking, and foreign assistance. How this increased funding
for CWT is made to work is just as important as the monetary
amounts. While there is more money to address CWT, funding
is also being diverted from other budget lines and activities,
including those related to conservation and biodiversity protec-
tion. An Environment program officer from one of the US’ lead-
ing donor agencies (not USFWS) explained how since 2015 about
25% of the agency’s biodiversity budget is allocated specifically
to combating wildlife trafficking, with some of this being
diverted from other programming (Interview, 04/2019). A former
official from another agency providing foreign assistance to CWT
described a similar situation whereby, ‘‘they [State Department]
said, ‘Find money within your existing pot of funds [to fund
CWT].’ So, basically, cut other programs” (Interview, 04/2019).
In order to understand how this geopolitical context mobilizes
material effects on the ground in re-shaping ideas about biodi-
versity conservation, we next explore how foreign conservation
assistance by the USFWS Office of International Affairs, the coun-
try’s lead conservation agency at home and abroad, has changed
over time.9 See https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+and
+Budget for consolidated appropriation acts by year. The vast majority of CWT
funding from Sub-Committee on Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs is appropriated to USAID’s biodiversity budget. These numbers
provide useful context to understand the increase in funding for CWT from the
highest levels of US government.
Fig. 1. Timeline of key events from 2011 to 2019 related to US domestic and international interventions to combat wildlife trafficking. Figure was developed through an
iterative process involving document collection and analysis, interview coding, as well as repeated engagement with key expert stakeholders who revised and commented on
earlier drafts in order to generate consensus around key moments, reports, legislation, and public events. Graphics credit: Ink and Water.
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the US Fish and Wildlife Service International Affairs
From fiscal year 2002 to the end of fiscal year 2018, USFWS
International Affairs supported 4,142 projects, worth
$301,054,957 USD in 106 countries. Projects with a primary focus
on CWT account for a third of projects supported by USFWS and
approximately a third of all spending, a little over $100,000,000.
Projects with a primary focus on Habitat Conservation and Man-
agement account for approximately just under one fifth of all pro-
jects and 16% of all funding, approximately $49 million (Table 3).
When disaggregated by species category and regional category,
CWT is the largest category of foreign assistance from USFWS.
We are primarily concerned with reading across these funding
trends to understand whether or not there are shifts in what the
USFWS supports over time, and how, if at all, these shifts articulate
with the changing geopolitical context of conservation and IWT.
We find that the reframing of IWT as a key concern of US geopolit-
ical strategy has affected how the lead wildlife conservation
agency of the United States both approaches and supports the pro-
tection of biodiversity and their habitats in countries with wildlife
populations of interest to the global conservation community.
While the overarching mission of USFWS International Affairs
may continue to remain focused on conservation, what is priori-
tized as the most valuable kind of conservation work has changed
over time. As Fig. 2a shows, over the past 16 years the percentage
of projects funded by USFWS International Affairs coded as CWT
has risen steadily since 2002, while projects coded as any other
thematic category, including more general protected area manage-
ment and habitat protection, have followed a general downward
trend. While less immediately apparent, Fig. 2b similarly illustrates
a general trend of an increasing percentage of USFWS International
funding allocated towards CWT, especially after 2009. Funding for
CWT peaks in 2012 and 2018, coinciding with key moments where
IWT gains attention at higher policy levels. It is important to note
that Fig. 2a and b also demonstrate that USFWS has a consistent
history of funding CWT projects that predates the shifts in how
IWT is framed in US foreign policy and security debates as a geopo-
litical issue. Nevertheless, the relative percentage of projects with
CWT as a primary focus has increased substantially, especially
since 2011, the time leading up to major public statements and
policy shifts that place IWT squarely on the foreign policy and
national security agenda. A similar trend of an increasing relative
share of foreign assistance to CWT at the expensive of other objec-
tives is found across all species and regional categories.
While the funding trends shown in Fig. 2a and b indicate an
increasing prioritization of CWT in foreign assistance for biodiver-
sity conservation at the expense of other types of interventions and
projects, CWT is a broad category that can incorporate different
types of activities and sub-objectives. Recent literature critiques
the increasing conservation-sector focus on poaching as being
overly concerned with law enforcement-first approaches and
interventions that prioritize intelligence-gathering and counter-
insurgency techniques, for example (Duffy et al., 2019; Roe et al.,
2015). It is therefore important to understand more precisely what
foreign assistance to CWT entails. This is not only because CWT is
the most significant funding category of USFWS, but because, as
our data shows, it is one that the USFWS and higher levels of US
government are prioritizing.
As a reminder, we coded each of the 1418 projects categorized
as either CWT or Demand Reduction according to one of these six
World Bank intervention categories (See Table 2). Table 4 displays
these results. Of the 1418 projects with a primary CWT objective,
those projects that support protected area management to prevent
poaching accounted for 70% of all projects and spending on CWTfrom 2002 to the end of fiscal year 2018. This category of assistance
largely entails funding for the training, establishment, and ongoing
operations of anti-poaching or law enforcement units within
spaces of conservation. Operational support could also include
funds for surveillance equipment and aircraft, 4x4 vehicles, moni-
toring systems, or field posts for anti-poaching units. As a World
Bank official explained, this category is to address poaching on
the ground (Interview 04/2019). The second largest category was
‘‘law enforcement”, accounting for a fifth of all spending and pro-
jects with a primary focus on CWT. The ‘‘law enforcement” cate-
gory differs from support to protected area management to
prevent poaching in several ways. First, law enforcement projects
are primarily focused on the national and international scale,
rather than the local scale of the protected area. Second, the activ-
ities in these projects largely take place outside of protected areas
and even outside of what we might normally think of as ‘‘conser-
vation” institutions or actors. Examples of such projects include:
providing training and equipment to customs officials to more
effectively intercept illicit wildlife products at ports of entry and
exit; supporting law enforcement bodies with national and cross-
border intelligence gathering activities; training and institutional
support for wildlife crime investigation and prosecutions; and sup-
porting national and transnational law enforcement operations to
investigate and arrest high-level wildlife traffickers and syndicate
members.
Taking these categories together, direct law enforcement in
the form of anti-poaching and patrolling in protected areas and
law enforcement outside of protected areas to directly address
IWT accounts for >90% of all CWT-focused interventions funded
by the USFWS international affairs since 2002. The remaining
9–10% of CWT-focused funding and projects is shared among
research and assessments, communications and awareness (lar-
gely demand reduction), policy and legislation, and promoting
sustainable use and alternative livelihoods. As a percentage of
the larger USFWS dataset, projects with a direct law enforcement
focus as described in the ‘‘law enforcement” and ‘‘PA manage-
ment to prevent anti-poaching” account for 31% of all USFWS
international affairs funding and projects supported from 2002
to 2018. More foreign assistance has thus gone to supporting
direct law enforcement than to any other broad category of
USFWS foreign conservation assistance, including habitat conser-
vation and management.
Tracking these CWT categories across time shows an increase in
the relative amount of funding allocated to projects in the ‘‘law
enforcement” category, as well as an increase in the proportion
of projects with that focus beginning in 2014. This was the first
year where the Foreign Appropriations Act directed funds to com-
bat wildlife poaching and trafficking and is after the US Senate
Hearings, Hillary Clinton’s State Department meeting, and the issu-
ing of the Executive Order on Combating Wildlife Trafficking.
While there is still a strong and primary focus on anti-poaching
and protected area level enforcement in foreign assistance to bio-
diversity conservation, the data suggests that in the period follow-
ing IWT’s integration into the foreign policy agenda as an issue of
national security concern, USFWS’ foreign assistance to biodiver-
sity conservation began to give more priority to CWT interventions
outside of the traditional spaces and institutions related to conser-
vation, and towards more policing and intelligence practices
focused on arresting wildlife traffickers and intercepting trafficked
wildlife materials. Moreover, these increases in ‘‘law enforcement”
coincide with relative decreases in funding and projects in the
other five CWT intervention categories. As with the broader portfo-
lio of USFWS foreign assistance, this trend is indicative of the
changing geopolitical context of IWT and conservation assistance
within the US Federal Government.
Table 3
Summary of USFWS International Affairs Spending from 2002 to 2018.
Objective # of Projects % of Projects Funding Allocated (USD) % of Overall Funding
All 141 3.4 36,390,158 12.1
Anti-Poaching/CWT/Law Enforcement 1,380 33.3 100,798,114 33.4
Capacity Building of Stakeholders 305 7.4 35,520,980 11.8
CBNRM 414 10.0 20,206,058 6.7
Demand Reduction 38 0.9 3,228,629 1.1
Education, Dissemination, Networking 388 9.4 18,264,839 6.1
Habitat Conservation & Management 772 18.6 49,080,648 16.3
HWC Management 228 5.5 12,206,050 4.1
Research 476 11.5 25,359,481 8.4
Total 4,142 100 301,054,957 100
Fig. 2. Percentage of USFWS funded projects per coded objective category (2a, top), and percentage of total funds allocated by USFWS per coded objective category (2b,
bottom).
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Table 4
Breakdown of US Fish and Wildlife Service CWT and Demand Reduction projects coded using World Bank CWT intervention categories.
CWT Category # of Projects % of Projects $(USD) Allocated % of Funding
Communications and awareness 45 3.2 3,808,264 3.3
Law Enforcement 281 19.8 20,778,751 19.8
PA Management to prevent poaching 986 69.5 72,010,749 69.5
Policy and Legislation 12 0.9 1,651,133 0.8
Promoting Sustainable use and alternative livelihoods 34 2.4 1,588,415 2.4
Research and Assessments 60 4.2 4,189,431 4.2
Total 1,418 100 104,026,743 100
F. Massé, J.D. Margulies /World Development 132 (2020) 104958 11A number of critiques over the past decade concern the lack of
focus and funding for supporting communities in and around pro-
tected areas and poaching hotspots, support that could help
address the root causes of IWT and poaching in particular (Duffy
& Humphreys, 2014; Duffy et al., 2019; Roe et al., 2015). Many of
these critiques are concerned with the negative impacts of
heavy-handed and enforcement-first approaches (Annecke &
Masubele, 2016; Duffy et al., 2019; Lunstrum, 2014). Given these
concerns, we analysed what portion of the 1418 CWT-focused pro-
jects supported by USFWS since 2002 had a community compo-
nent. Out of 1418 CWT-focused projects, 247 (17%) had a
component to include communities in activities. 89% (n = 214) of
these CWT-projects with a community component consisted of
establishing or supporting community-based anti-poaching,
patrolling, or support to law enforcement. Like others, we encour-
age efforts to include communities in anti-poaching and law
enforcement, but these must be sensitive to potential drawbacks
for those communities involved (Massé, Gardiner, Lubilo, &
Themba, 2017; Roe et al., 2015). Moreover, community anti-
poaching still takes an enforcement-first approach and does not
necessarily address the primary drivers of why people engage in
and/or support illicit wildlife economies. This lack of support to
addressing the root causes of poaching is further exaggerated
when looking across the different species categories. Community
patrols to protect nesting turtles and their eggs account for 50%
of all funded projects on anti-poaching prevention with a commu-
nity component. Materially, these results indicate that the CWT-
related interventions supported by USFWS follow broader conser-
vation and CWT trends of giving relatively little funding support to
community-oriented initiatives (Duffy & Humphreys, 2014; The
World Bank, 2016). This is especially true for interventions focused
on charismatic megafauna such as elephants and rhino in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where poverty, opportunity for economic advance-
ment, vulnerability, and dangers associated with living with wild-
life are often driving forces behind illegal hunting.
5.1. Beyond the numbers: Justifying foreign assistance to biodiversity
in geopolitical terms
Theprevious section demonstrates how the heightenedprofile of
IWT in US politics has led to a dramatic increase in security-related
funding for conservation andCWT througha shift in the allocationof
foreign conservation assistance. These patterns occur alongside dis-
cursive shifts inwhat IWTand foreign assistance to biodiversity con-
servation signifies. We see this, for example, in USFWS annual
budget justification reports. The language the USFWS uses to justify
its annual budget to the US Department of Interior and related Con-
gressional Appropriations committees recently incorporated
‘‘geopolitics”, alongside increasing use of the words ‘‘trafficking”,
‘‘poaching”, and ‘‘crime” over the past decade (Fig. 3).
The increasing use of crime and security language by USFWS to
justify its work is an acknowledgement of the geopolitically-
charged milieu in which the primary conservation agency of the
United States finds itself responding to, and affirming, the geopolit-ical concerns and desires of the United States foreign policy appa-
ratus. As one USFWS International Affairs staff member explained:
We are the only agency in the US government that is conserva-
tion for conservation’s sake and not in the name of something else,
because that is our department and agency mission. . .It is about
the conservation of the species. I mean, we can talk more about
security, but we have always recognized security and stability,
and we have some other work in Central Africa that is related to
all of that and poverty reduction and human interaction, but for
us it is about the conservation (Interview, 04/2018).
This statement suggests that while USFWS staff believe conser-
vation matters intersect with security concerns, the mission of
USFWS remains unaffected by broader geopolitical contexts. Our
findings are at odds with this perspective, and at a minimum sug-
gest a significant reframing of what doing conservation work now
signifies in contemporary contexts compared to just ten years ago.
Beyond the shifts in foreign assistance presented above, the way
USFWS describes the International Affairs Division and its role as
a lead player in addressing IWT in the first pages of the 2020 Bud-
get Justification report is indicative of this point:
The Service plays a leadership role in the implementation of the
National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking, addressing
urgent conservation and global security threats posed by poaching
and illegal trade in wildlife (USFWS, 2020: IA-2).
USFWS uses similar language on the emergence of a
biodiversity-security nexus to justify a request for a program
change comprising of over $1 million in additional funding:
The recent escalation in poaching of protected species and the
corresponding illegal trade poses an urgent threat to conservation
and global security [. . .] The Service provides technical and finan-
cial assistance to partners to support innovative projects that
address wildlife poaching and trafficking by strengthening enforce-
ment, reducing demand for illegally traded wildlife, and expanding
international cooperation and commitment to mitigate this threat
(USFWS, 2020: IA-10).
The USFWS now explicitly positions itself through its program-
matic activities as working in support of US geopolitical interests.
The same 2020 report states ‘‘The [USFWS] Service funds, facili-
tates, and supports vital efforts to conserve wildlife and high value
landscapes that provide economic, geopolitical, and other benefits
to the American people” (USFWS, 2020: IA-10). We see this
broader articulation of foreign assistance to biodiversity conserva-
tion converging with US’ geopolitical interests most clearly in
USFWS’ work in Gabon, a country that receives by far the most for-
eign funding assistance from USFWS globally. While a number of
interviewees made clear Gabon receives a large amount of conser-
vation assistance because of the political will of its government to
invest in conservation (Garland, 2008), and because of the coun-
try’s biodiversity, the 2020 budget justification report discloses
broader geopolitical motivations that move far beyond IWT. Justi-
fying the large sums of money USFWS provides to Gabon, the
report states:
Controlling large-scale illegal fishing, mainly by foreign traw-
lers, is a shared interest between conservationists and energy
Fig. 3. Frequency of key words appearing in US Fish and Wildlife Service annual budget justification reports relative to document length (based on total word count).
10 UK anti-poaching support in Malawi to help tackle organised crimeRetrieved
from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-anti-poaching-support-in-malawi-
to-help-tackle-organised-crime.
12 F. Massé, J.D. Margulies /World Development 132 (2020) 104958producers. Working together through Gabon Bleu, these stakehold-
ers were able to meet biodiversity goals and enable the safe and
responsible development of Gabon’s energy resources, which
exports a majority of its oil output to the U.S (USFWS, 2020: IA-7).
USFWS uses similar geopolitical language in defining its work in
Latin America to conserve ‘‘the Western Hemisphere’s High-
biodiversity Value Landscapes”:
A stable and secure Western Hemisphere is critical to the safety
and economy of the American people. To that aim, the Service pro-
vides technical and financial support for conservation efforts in
Central and South America that help to support American business
and recreation in the region and strengthen rule of law (USFWS,
2020: IA-8).
The extent of geopolitical influence within and over conserva-
tion policy and practice thus manifest as a muchmore general phe-
nomenon beyond the specifics of wildlife trafficking.
6. The geopolitical ecology of conservation assistance
USFWS increasingly positions habitat and species protection as
both a concern of, and contributing to, national and geopolitical
security. While USFWS has always funded CWT-related efforts, this
has proportionally increased over time at the expense of other con-
servation priorities. Integrating thematic coding analysis with dis-
cursive textual analysis reveals clear connections between
discussions and framing of IWT as a matter of US geopolitical con-
cern in high-profile US political fora beginning in 2011–2012, and
changes in how USFWS positions and justifies their role as a con-
servation agency to US Congress. These changes, in turn, produce
material effects on the ground via the kinds of projects they sup-
port (or not) through international grants. Taken together, our
results signify a shift in what gets prioritized, materially supported
and understood as biodiversity conservation in US foreign policy
more generally, and addressing IWT more specifically.
Our case study of the USFWS demonstrates the ways in which
biodiversity conservation and threats to particular species are
increasingly mobilized as spatially powerful, discursively mal-
leable, and emotionally-laden concepts through which US geopo-
litical interests are furthered on the ground. The connections
being made between protecting biodiversity and geopolitical inter-
ests highlights an emerging and increasingly important category of
foreign conservation assistance that has joint ecological and
national security objectives, even where clear evidence of security
connections is lacking. Conservation assistance thus exists along-side development in furthering and reflecting the securitization
of foreign assistance, and foreign policy, more broadly.
The geopolitical context of IWT and its subsequent influence is
not limited to US foreign policy or assistance (e.g. Duffy, 2010). The
UK has held multiple international conferences on IWT (Fig. 1),
during which UK foreign policy actors have made similar, often
unsubstantiated, connections linking regional stability and secu-
rity with the need to intensify and militarize the fight against
IWT (Massé et al., 2020). These efforts have similarly resulted in
increases in foreign assistance from its Department for Environ-
ment, Food, and Rural Affairs’ (DEFRA) and Department for Interna-
tional Development, respectively, to CWT (DEFRA, 2019; Duffy &
Humphreys, 2014). Deepening connections between the military
and conservation assistance, DEFRA and the UK’s Ministry of
Defence have joined together to ‘‘to support and fund a series of
military-led counter-poaching activities” in Sub-Saharan Africa.10
The largest provider of multilateral environmental assistance, the
World Bank’s Global Environment Facility, has also given more prior-
ity to wildlife trafficking with the creation of the Global Wildlife
Program. Established in 2015, the Program provides $131 million
in grants to combat wildlife trafficking (and claims it will leverage
over $700 million more) (The World Bank, 2018). Over $56 million
of this has gone towards law enforcement-specific projects, while
$19 million has gone to landscape management and almost $33.5
million going towards community engagement, the latter of which
includes community policing.
By explicitly connecting the prevention of wildlife crime with
sustainable development, the Global Environmental Facility has
signalled that IWT is a development challenge and concern to
which international development assistance, and not just conser-
vation assistance, should be channelled. Reflecting the conclusions
of others (Marijnen, 2017; Massé et al., 2018), concerns about IWT
as a de-stabilizing regional force and threat to international secu-
rity (substantiated or not) have led to the integration of conserva-
tion in the development-security nexus, thereby re-shaping flows
and dynamics of development assistance related to conservation
and security. Our analysis has focused in detail on what this means
for foreign conservation assistance. What precisely this looks like
in terms of development assistance or assistance from
development-specific agencies and with what implications in
F. Massé, J.D. Margulies /World Development 132 (2020) 104958 13terms of assistance allocation and effects on the ground remains
unclear. This subject requires further research, and could be
advanced through the framework of geopolitical ecology of foreign
assistance as developed in this article.
A number of scholars have demonstrated the generative poten-
tial of putting the grounded empirical research tradition of political
ecology into deeper conversation with critical geopolitics and polit-
ical geography, disciplineswith long histories of theorizing the com-
plex nature of states and how power operates across geographic
scales (Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, & Svarstad, 2001; Robbins,
2008). Political ecologists are often more accustomed to, and excel
at, studying the messy and conflicting character of the state in the
management of non-human nature at relatively small geographic
extents and fine-scales of analysis. We find, however, that many of
the analytical methods familiar to political ecology are in fact well
suited to ‘studying up’ the state and its geopolitical nature (Nader,
1969). This is not only to understand the complex character of state
actors operating on the ground embroiled in the negotiations of ‘ev-
eryday politics’—for instance, through ethnographic studies of
bureaucrats (Gupta, 2012; Corson, 2016)—but in order to say some-
thing more meaningful about the broader apparatuses of state
power at work crafting and intervening in human-environment
interactions from a distance (Bigger &Neimark, 2017; O’Lear, 2019).
Methodologically then, we see promise in future efforts com-
bining diverse sources and types of data to develop richer under-
standings of how geopolitical strategy moves outwards from
recognized seats of formal power, reconfiguring human-
environment relations. We acknowledge, however, that analyses
oriented in the reverse direction—’from the ground up’—are just
as important for fully embracing a geopolitical ecology. Other
methodological opportunities for tracing the entwined flows of
financing and political intent in producing environmental change
abound: for instance, future work building on the research pre-
sented here through ‘follow the policy’ and ‘follow the money’
approaches could explore in greater detail how the discursive
and funding shifts we describe in this article affect particular local-
ities and the human as well as non-human communities foreign
assistance interventions seek to influence (Peck & Theodore,
2012). At the same time, the findings we present matter in several
pressing ways, which speak to concerns echoed elsewhere.
First, our findings show how contemporary conservation is char-
acterized by the ratcheting up of investment in the securitization of
responses to IWT, and the capturing of discursive control over how
IWT is framed as a conservation problem turned national security
threat. Our approach to examining these dynamics through geopo-
litical ecology provides a detailed narrative of how this shift has
materialized at the global scale over time. Second, there are new
practices materializing on the ground within the context of refram-
ing IWT as a national security issue. This is best evidenced by the
increasing amount of funding and support for law enforcement
and policing efforts outside of the traditional spaces and institu-
tions of biodiversity conservation. These include support for
(cross-border) intelligence activities, wildlife crime investigation
and prosecutorial capacity, and support to (trans)national law
enforcement and policing operations. Scaling up efforts beyond tra-
ditional spaces and institutions of conservation like protected areas
has a role to play in addressing IWT. But, this trend demonstrates
how under growing geopolitical pressure, foreign conservation
assistance increasingly reflects the approaches and objectives of
foreign police assistance (Hills, 2006; Friesendorf, 2016). A geopo-
litical ecology highlights the need to take seriously the emerging
ways in which foreign conservation and environmental assistance
might support and articulate with other foreign policy agendas of
legal, policing, and security-sector reform (Ellison and Pino,
2012). Moreover, the growth in these law enforcement approaches
reflect securitization’s ability to repress or minimize more funda-mental questions concerned with ‘‘power and distribution” that
underpin so many environmental challenges (Gourevitch, 2010,
413), including conservation and biodiversity protection.
Finally, the results of this study offer new insights about how
geopolitical discourse matters materially (O’Lear, 2019), affecting
economic investments in particular conservation approaches at
the expense of others. Given the trends we discuss, these shifts in
investment point towards continued underfunding of conservation
programs focused on livelihoods and economic well-being, and
even general habitat and landscape protection, in favor of ‘law
and order’ and securitized approaches to doing conservation in
the name of curbing IWT (Büscher, 2016; Duffy, 2016). Looking
towards future research efforts, we ask: if the language of conserva-
tion and combatting illegal wildlife trade is entirely captured in the
US and elsewhere as a geopolitical subject, who, or what, will win
and lose as a result of these new discursive arrangements? Howwill
conservation as geopolitics produce, shape, and reconfigure new
socio-environmental relations where conservation is practiced?
Answering such questions would complement our examination of
the broad pattern of geopolitics’ discursive entrance into conserva-
tion as a generalizable and increasingly powerful dynamic shaping
the very nature of what conservation may become.7. Conclusion
In this article we advance empirical and conceptual under-
standings of geopolitical ecology by showing how biodiversity con-
servation is increasingly geopolitical in its nature, and how
powerful geopolitical actors work through conservation in an effort
to control, constrain, and produce global socionatures in advanta-
geous geopolitical configurations. Our findings demonstrate an
impressive leveraging and reworking of conservation threats, and
more specifically IWT, as a concern of national security to support
and justify US geopolitical statecraft around the world.
To return to the epigraph of our article, when Secretary of State
Hilary Clinton said ‘‘there’s something for everybody” in illegal
wildlife trade, we understand this to mean that combating wildlife
trafficking has emerged as a successful and strategic space of con-
vergence through which geopolitical actors can coalesce power
and exert political will. The intensification of conservation spaces
(once again) as violent arenas of war, oppression, disenfranchise-
ment, and dispossession remain problematic and unsettling as
made clear elsewhere (e.g. Annecke & Masubele, 2016; Asiyanbi,
2016; Barbora, 2017; Büscher & Fletcher, 2018; Duffy, 2016;
Duffy et al., 2019; Kelly & Ybarra, 2016; Lunstrum, 2014). But here,
our analysis stretches deeper into spaces where often the most
politically significant decisions about what to support and how
to best conserve biodiversity through foreign assistance play out,
while remaining furthest removed from where conservation activ-
ities occur in practice. While acknowledging the real threat to bio-
diversity that IWT poses, we demonstrate in explicit terms the
material effects of geopolitical discursive acts for reshaping the pri-
orities of conservation activities and the political-economy of for-
eign conservation assistance through the interconnected
networks and spaces through which power moves. Tracing out
these political-economic linkages through the monetary flows of
foreign assistance by the USFWS, we find that geopolitical ecology
is a productive analytical framework for interrogating how issues
of geopolitical and environmental concern re-shape one another.CRediT authorship contribution statement
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